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Abstract— This paper investigates the impact of the de-
termination of the original initiator of a transmission on
both customers and providers. The presented model, which
performs inter-provider cost distribution based on the differ-
entiated traffic flows was compared with the existing model,
where intercarrier compensation is based on the net traffic
flows. The studies consider markets with reciprocal and non-
reciprocal access charges.
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1. Introduction
The Internet is a system of interconnected networks,
which are connected either through a direct link or an
intermediate point, called Internet exchange point (IXP) to
exchange traffic. Currently the Internet provides two basic
types of interconnections such as peering and transit, and
their variations [1-2]. Peering is the arrangement of traffic
exchange on the free-settlement basis, called bill-and-keep
(BAK), so that Internet service providers (ISPs) do not pay
each other and derive revenues from their own customers.
In the transit model, a customer ISP pays a transit ISP
to deliver the traffic between the customers. The outcome
of the negotiation process of being a transit or peered
customer reflects on the assessment of the actual cost of
traffic exchange [3-4]. According to the estimates in [5],
80% of the Internet traffic is routed via private peering.
Emergence of new types of ISPs (with large number of
customers and great amount of content) led to appearance
of paid peering and partial transit.
Traditionally, before interconnecting, provider calculates
whether the interconnection benefits would outweigh the
costs [6]. Simple economic principle suggests sharing the
costs between all parties. In the case of telephony, the study
[7] argued that both calling and called parties benefit from
the call, and consequently, should share the interconnection
costs. In the Internet, under symmetry of traffic flows, the
termination costs are set to zero, since it is assumed that
the termination fees are roughly the same, and a peering
arrangement is used. However, because no termination cost
is charged, settlement-free model is considered inefficient
in terms of cost compensation [8]. Generally, if providers
are asymmetric in terms of size, peering is not appropriate,
since providers incur different costs and benefit differently.
In such a case, an interconnection arrangement is governed
by the financial compensation in a bilaterally or unilaterally
negotiated basis. In the bilateral settlement arrangements,
the payments are based on the net traffic flow. In the
unilateral settlement arrangements, a customer provider pays
for sent and received traffic, even though traffic flows in
both directions. This causes the existence of imbalance in
allocation of the interconnection costs. In particular, smaller
providers in high cost areas admit higher subscription fees.
There exists a large body of literature that discusses intercon-
nection challenges [6, 9-12]. Various pricing schemes have
attempted to provide sustainable conditions for smaller ISPs
[13-14]. These models make different trade-offs between the
two objectives of interconnection pricing, viz., competition
development and profitability. Hence, no single model has
a clear advantage over the others. As cited in [5], it was
recommended to establish bilateral settlement arrangements
and to compensate each provider for the costs that it incurs
in carrying traffic generated by the other network. However,
it was argued that traffic flows are not a reasonable indicator
to share the costs, since it is not clear who originally initiated
a transmission and, therefore, who should pay for the costs.
In other words, compensation between providers cannot be
solely done based on the traffic flows, which provide a poor
basis for cost sharing [5].
Recently provided analytical studies in [15-16], investi-
gated the impact of the original initiator of a transmission at
the wholesale market in the case of private peering and tran-
sit arrangements. Further, we provided preliminary results
examining a retail market with reciprocal access charges
[17]. However, the remaining literature on the economics
of interconnection considers the intercarrier compensation
based only on the flows of traffic [7, 18-21].
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the
role of the determination of a transmission initiator on both
retail and wholesale markets considering private peering
arrangements. The paper differs from the prior reported
studies in that it examines how beneficial is the traffic
differentiation to both customers and providers and considers
elastic demand. Our studies involve the earlier introduced
model, called Differentiated Traffic-based Interconnection
Agreement (DTIA) that distinguishes traffic into two types
to determine a transmission initiator in the IP networks and
to compensate the costs. In contrast to the existing solutions
[3], in which the payments are based on traffic flows, we
compensate differently for a particular traffic type. Unlike
telephony, where the transmission initiator covers the entire
costs, the proposed model distributes the joint costs be-
tween all parties. Comparative studies were provided for the
agreements based on the traffic flows (TF) and differentiated
traffic flows compensations. We consider models with both
symmetric and asymmetric access charges. The rest of the
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses existing
financial settlements. Section 3 describes the motivation for
traffic differentiation. Section 4 provides analytical studies.
Section 5 concludes this paper.
2. Financial Settlements
Generally, providers arrange financial settlements in order
to determine the distribution of the interconnection costs [3].
Before examining financial settlements within the Internet,
we consider the telephone system. As an example, assume
a scenario, where Alice makes a call to Bob. Accepting the
call, Bob incurs termination costs to its provider that should
be covered either directly by billing Bob or indirectly by
billing the calling party’s carrier. As cited in [8], “existing
access charge rules and the majority of existing reciprocal
compensation agreements require the calling party’s carrier,
[. . . ], to compensate the called party’s carrier for terminating
the call”. Thus, the initiator of the call, i.e., Alice pays
to a subscribed provider for the entire call since Alice
asked to reserve the circuit. In contrast to the telephony
example, establishing a connection in the Internet does not
require any reservation of a circuit. Usually packets between
Alice and Bob are routed independently, sometimes even
via different paths. Therefore, as cited in [22], “it is very
important to distinguish between the initiator and the sender,
and likewise between the destination and the receiver”. The
initiator is the party that initiates a call or a session, and
the destination is the party that receives a call. In contrast,
the sender (the originator) is the party that sends traffic,
and the receiver (the terminator) is the party that receives
traffic. In telephony, the initiator is considered to be the
originator and is charged based on the transaction unit,
namely a “call minute” for using the terminating network.
Even though it may be argued that a TCP session can
be considered as a call, where the initiator of a session
pays for the entire traffic flow, such a model deals with
technical issues, considerable costs, and implies uniform
retail pricing. Currently the Internet uses the packet-based
accounting model, under which the volume of the exchange
traffic in both directions is measured, and adopts a small set
of interconnection arrangements. Specifically, in the service-
provider (unilateral) settlement, namely transit and paid
peering business relationships, a customer ISP pays to a
transit ISP for sent and received traffic. In the settlement-
free agreement, namely peering relationships, providers do
not pay each other. In some cases ISPs adopt the negotiated-
financial (bilateral) settlement where the payments are based
on the net flow of traffic. For discussions see [3, 22-23].
3. Motivation for Traffic Differentiation
The principle that we follow is that both parties derive
benefits from the exchange of traffic and, therefore, should
share the interconnection costs. Considering a system with-
out externalities [24], the costs should be shared based on
the benefits obtained by each party. However, in the real
world, it is impossible to measure the benefits of parties and
so to share the costs. If content is not equally distributed
between providers, traffic imbalance occurs, and hence, costs
and revenues are not shared evenly. As cited in [25], traffic
flow is dominant towards a customer requested the content
and generates 85% of the Internet traffic. This implies that
inbound traffic is much more compared to outbound traffic
of content request. In telephony for example, it is acceptable
that more than 50% of rural network’s revenue could come
from the incoming calls. In contrast, in the Internet, customer
networks pay for the entire traffic flows. It was recommended
to compensate each provider for the costs that it incurs in
carrying traffic based on the traffic flows. However, traffic
flows are not a good measure for costs sharing, since “it is
impossible to determine who originally initiated any given
transmission on the Internet” and therefore, provide a poor
basis for cost sharing [5]. On the other hand, providers are
unwilling to inspect the IP header of a packet, since “the cost
of carrying an individual packet is extremely small, and the
cost of accounting for each packet may well be greater than
the cost of carrying the packet across the providers” [23].
The DTIA model presented in [26] manages inter-provider
cost compensation considering an original initiator of a
transmission. In order to determine a party that originally
initiated a transmission, we differentiated traffic into two
types, referred to as native, which is originally initiated by
the provider’s own customers, and stranger that is originally
initiated by the customers of any other network. Indeed, out-
going traffic of ISPi that is the same as adjacent provider’s
incoming traffic may be i) either a part of a transmission
initiated by a customer of ISPi, ii) or a part of a transmission
initiated by a customer of any other network. Further, we
suggest that providers compensate differently for a particular
type of traffic, where stranger traffic is charged at a lower
rate than native traffic. More specifically, each provider set-
tled DTIA compensates the cost of carrying traffic according
to the differentiated traffic flows. For detailed description of
DTIA and its traffic management mechanism see [26].
4. The Model of Interconnection
Analytical studies are based on the bargaining process
that is explored using Nash bargaining solution (NBS) which
provides a fair and Pareto efficient outcome. This approach
is taken in [20]. We begin by considering a market with
non-reciprocal access charges, and continue by examining
a case, where providers set reciprocal access rates. In our
analysis we follow an assumption done in [18] to capture
traffic imbalance and therefore, consider two types of the
customers, namely websites (which host information and
content) and consumers (who use information and content
provided on websites). Actually, traffic is exchanged between
consumers, between websites, from websites to consumers,
and from consumers to websites. According to the proposed
approach, a node (customer) in a P2P network is considered
as a consumer as well as a website simultaneously, since it
can act as a client and as a server. Thus, traffic generated
from websites to consumers and vice versa along with
Web, FTP and streaming media traffic captures P2P traffic.
Traffic between consumers captures VoIP traffic that tends
to be symmetric, and email exchange that is much smaller
than traffic generated from websites to consumers. The
studies investigate how explicit monetary transfers between
providers depend on the differentiated traffic flows and
focus on traffic asymmetry in its simplest way. Hence, they
consider traffic exchange i) from consumers to websites,
and ii) from websites to consumers. To simplify analytical
studies the following assumptions were made in the paper:
Assumption 1: Let αi ∈ (0, 1) network i’s market share
for consumers and βi ∈ (0, 1) its market share for websites.
The market consists of two providers i 6= j = 1, 2 and
αi + αj = α, βi + βj = β.
Assumption 2: For simplicity, a balanced calling pattern,
where each consumer requests any website in any network
with the same probability is considered.
Assumption 3: Each customer chooses only one provider
to join, because of homogeneity of services. For simplicity,
the number of consumers (websites) is normalized to one.
4.1 Demand Structure
We examine a scenario where ISPi has signed an intercon-
nection agreement with ISPj . Each customer derives utility
from sending and receiving traffic. Let qi be an individual de-
mand, i.e., traffic volume originated by a particular customer.
The marginal utility of consuming connection services is
u(qi) = (γ − 0.5qi)qi (1)
Given I income, a customer tries to solve the following
problem subject to the budget constraint
max
qi
[u(qi)− piqi] s.t. piqi +m ≤ I (2)
where pi is a price for the consuming connection services
and m denotes the consumption of all other goods. By
solving the consumer surplus maximization problem, the
level of traffic that optimizes customer’s utility is
qi(pi) = γ − pi (3)
The indirect utility (i.e., the maximum utility with the current
price and income) of a customer is calculated by substituting
(3) in the maximization problem (2) and is given by
υ(pi) =
“
γ − γ − pi
2
”
(γ − pi)− pi(γ − pi) = (γ − pi)
2
2
(4)
Let psi and p
r
i (p˜
s
i and p˜
r
i ) be the network i’s prices
that a subscribed consumer (website) pays for sending and
receiving a unit of traffic respectively. Hence, the overall
net utility derived by a consumer and a website of ISPi is
defined as a function of the costs associated with originating
and receiving traffic. It is calculated as follows
Ui = [u(qsi )− psi qsi ] +
[
u(q˜sj )− pri q˜sj
]
(5)
U˜i = [u(q˜si )− p˜si q˜si ] +
[
u(qsj )− p˜ri qsj
]
(6)
where qsi (q˜
s
i ) is amount of traffic originated by a consumer
(a website) of ISPi. Given that each consumer of the
network i initiates qi requests, then the total amount of traffic
originated by IPSi is αiqi, where βj proportion goes to ISPj .
Analogously, network i’s website originates q˜i traffic, and αj
proportion of it is terminated in ISPj . As a result, the amount
of native and stranger traffic from ISPi to ISPj is defined by
tnatij = αiβjq
s
i t
str
ij = αjβiq˜
s
i (7)
Similarly, qj (q˜j) traffic is generated by each consumer
(website) of ISPj , and the proportion βi (αi) is destined for
the peered network. Thus, the amount of native and stranger
traffic originating in ISPj and terminating in ISPi is
tnatji = αjβiq
s
j t
str
ji = αiβj q˜
s
j (8)
Summarizing, the total traffic volumes originated by the
providers present the sum of native and stranger traffic
volumes and are calculated as follows
tij = tnatij + t
str
ij tji = t
nat
ji + t
str
ji (9)
Because a receiver pays principle [27] is considered, qsi and
q˜si depend not only on the price charged by the customer’s
provider, but also on the price that the rival network charges
the receiver to terminate traffic. Consequently, at equilibrium
the amount of traffic originated by a consumer and a website
of ISPi and ready to be accepted in the peered network
corresponds to the minimum level of communications
qsi = min
{
γ − psi , γ − p˜rj
}
q˜si = min
{
γ − p˜si , γ − prj
} (10)
The results may be summarized in the following way
qsi =
{
γ − psi if psi ≥ p˜rj
γ − p˜rj if psi ≤ p˜rj
(11)
q˜si =
{
γ − p˜si if p˜si ≥ prj
γ − prj if p˜si ≤ prj
(12)
Since providers are compensated when utilizing their in-
frastructures, we assume that prices for receiving traffic are
lower then prices for sending traffic.
4.2 Non-reciprocal Access Charges
We start by examining a market with non-reciprocal
access charges. Let network i’s marginal costs of origination
and termination be coi > 0 and c
t
i > 0 respectively, where
coi = c
t
i. The marginal costs exhibit increasing returns
to scale meaning that the incremental costs of a network
increase as the network size decreases. For simplicity, the
fixed network costs are normalized to zero. The access
charges of ISPs for terminating native and stranger traffic are
denoted by ai and bi respectively, where ai > bi. To carry
out analysis, we assume that the network’s access charge for
terminating native traffic is set to the termination marginal
cost, i.e., ai = cti, and for terminating stranger traffic is
defined by bi = εai, where 0.5 ≤ ε < 1. To simplify studies
we fix ε = 0.5, however, it is important to note, that the
results are robust for the entire interval of ε. The model
ignores on-net traffic, since it is focused on explicit monetary
transfers between providers. The incremental profit that ISPi
obtains from the interconnection is calculated as
Πi = αiβj(p
s
i − coi − aj)qsi + αjβi(p˜si − coi − bj)q˜si
+ αjβi(p˜
r
i + ai − cti)qsj + αiβj(pri + bi − cti)q˜sj
(13)
Retail prices
Consider the case when the providers act as monopolists.
Therefore, each provider will choose level of the exchanged
traffic that maximizes its profits. This demand has to be
lower than, or equal to, a certain value and is given bymaxqsi Πi s.t q
s
i ≤ γ − p˜rj
max
q˜si
Πi s.t q˜si ≤ γ − prj
(14)
From first order conditions for profit maximization follows
psi =
{
γ+coi+a
2 if
γ+coi+a
2 ≥ p˜rj
p˜rj if
γ+coi+a
2 ≤ p˜rj
(15)
p˜si =
{
γ+coi+b
2 if
γ+coi+b
2 ≥ prj
prj if
γ+coi+b
2 ≤ prj
(16)
It is straightforward to show that the first-order conditions,
which determine the prices for terminating traffic are equal
to a perceived marginal cost, and thus, are defined as follows
p˜ri = c
t
i − ai (17)
pri = c
t
i − bi (18)
The optimal demands can be calculated by replacing the
obtained prices in (11) and (12). Retail revenues that ISPi
obtaines from the subscribed consumers and websites are
pii(psi , p
r
i ) = t
nat
ij p
s
i + t
str
ji p
r
i
p˜ii(p˜si , p˜
r
i ) = t
str
ij p˜
s
i + t
nat
ji p˜
r
i
Substituting the optimal demands in (13), the profit function
of ISPi can be rewritten as follows
Πi = αiβj(γ − psi )(psi − coi − aj) + αjβi(γ − p˜si )(p˜si − coi − bj)
+ αjβi(γ − psj)(p˜ri + ai − cti) + αiβj(γ − p˜sj)(pri + bi − cti)
The outcome of the network according to the bargaining
game (where providers equally split their payoffs) is
ΠNBS = 0.5(Πi + Πj)
If Πi > Πj , then ISPj receives the net interconnection
payment from ISPi that is
ΠNBS −Πj = 0.5 (Πi −Πj) = ∆σ (19)
Replacing the obtained prices to the expression (19) the net
interconnection charge can be rewritten as follows
0.5(Πi − Πj) = 0.5
"
αiβj
„
γ − coi − aj
2
«2
− αjβi
 
γ − coj − ai
2
!2#
+ 0.5
"
αjβi
„
γ − coi − bj
2
«2
− αiβj
 
γ − coj − bi
2
!2#
In DTIA, the net interconnection payment is considered
as two independent components i) one for a native traffic
business, which is denoted by σnatij , and ii) another for a
stranger traffic business that is denoted by σstrij . Then
σnatij = 0.5
[
αiβj
(
γ−coi−aj
2
)2
− αjβi
(
γ−coj−ai
2
)2]
(20)
σstrij = 0.5
[
αjβi
(
γ−coi−bj
2
)2
− αiβj
(
γ−coj−bi
2
)2]
(21)
The following analyses explore how the interconnection
payments depend on the determination of a transmission
initiator, considering all available cases of the market state
in terms of providers’ sizes (i.e. market shares).
Proposition 1: If αi = αj and βi = βj , then the net
interconnection payments between providers are zero.
Proof: Given that providers are symmetric in terms of
size, then cti = c
t
j and access charges for native and stranger
traffic flows are equal correspondingly. From (20) and (21),
it is straightforward to show that σnatij = σ
str
ij = 0.
Proposition 2: If αi = αj and βi > βj , then ISPi (ISPj)
subsidizes ISPj (ISPi) for strange (native) traffic.
Proof: From the definition follows that cti < c
t
j and
αiβj < αjβi.
Native: Considering (20), where (γ−coi−aj) = (γ−coj−ai)
follows that σnatij < 0. Here, ISPj subsidizes ISPi.
Stranger: Given that (γ − coi − bj) > (γ − coj − bi) and the
business for stranger traffic (21), we obtain that σstrij > 0.
Thus, ISPj receives the payment from ISPi.
Proposition 3: If βi = βj and αi > αj , then ISPi
subsidizes ISPj for native traffic.
Proof: Given that βi = βj and αi > αj , then cti < c
t
j
and αiβj > αjβi.
Native: From (20), we get that σnatij > 0. This implies that
ISPi subsidizes ISPj for native traffic exchange.
Stranger: Considering the business for stranger traffic, (21)
is not straightforward and is defined by
σstrij
8><>:
> 0 if αjβi/αiβj > (γ − coj − bi)2/(γ − coi − bj)2
= 0 if αjβi/αiβj = (γ − coj − bi)2/(γ − coi − bj)2
< 0 if αjβi/αiβj < (γ − coj − bi)2/(γ − coi − bj)2
(22)
where (γ − coi − bj) 6= 0.
When αi > αj and βi > βj , the following cases for
the traffic volumes are obtained from (9) 1) tij > tji, 2)
tij < tji, and 3) tij = tji. The cases 1) and 2) are analogous
to those described above. The last case is analyzed below.
Proposition 4: If αi > αj , βi > βj , and tij = tji, then
αi > βi and βj > αj .
Proof: The result is obtained from (20) and (21).
Proposition 5: If αi > αj , βi > βj , and tij = tji, then
ISPi subsidizes ISPj for native traffic.
Proof: From the definition follows that cti < c
t
j .
Native: Considering (20) and result of Proposition (4), it
can be obtained that σnatij > 0. This implies that ISPj is
subsidized by ISPi.
Stranger: The component of stranger traffic (21) is not
straightforward and is defined by (22).
Allowing that αi > αj and βi < βj , the following cases
for the termination costs are possible: 1) cti > c
t
j , 2) c
t
i < c
t
j ,
and 3) cti = c
t
j . The cases 1) and 2) are similar to those
described above. The last case when the networks are equal
in terms of size is examined below.
Proposition 6: If αi > αj , βi < βj , and cti = c
t
j ,
then ISPi (ISPj) subsidizes ISPj (ISPi) for native (stranger)
traffic.
Proof: Symmetry of networks in terms of size implies
that βi = αj .
Native: Considering the native traffic component (20), it can
be obtained that σnatij > 0, therefore ISPi subsidizes ISPj .
Stranger: From (21) follows that σstrij < 0. In this case, ISPi
receives the net payment from ISPj .
4.3 Reciprocal Access Charges
In the following lines we examine a market with sym-
metric access rates, where the charge for terminating native
traffic is set to the lowest termination marginal cost. Other
parameters are defined analogously to the prior studies. The
components for native and stranger traffic businesses are
σnatij = 0.5
[
αiβj
(
γ−coi−a
2
)2
− αjβi
(
γ−coj−a
2
)2]
(23)
σstrij = 0.5
[
αjβi
(
γ−coi−b
2
)2
− αiβj
(
γ−coj−b
2
)2]
(24)
Analytical studies provided below consider all available
market states in terms of providers’ sizes.
Proposition 7: If αi = αj and βi = βj , then the net
interconnection payments between providers are zero.
Proof: From (23)-(24) follows that σnatij = σ
str
ij = 0.
Proposition 8: If αi = αj and βi > βj , then ISPi
subsidizes ISPj for stranger traffic.
Proof: If αi = αj and βi > βj , then cti < c
t
j , αiβj <
αjβi and a = cti.
Native: Considering the native traffic business, where (γ −
coi − a) > (γ − coj − a), (23) is not straightforward
σnatij
8><>:
> 0 if αiβj/αjβi > (γ − coj − a)2/(γ − coi − a)2
= 0 if αiβj/αjβi = (γ − coj − a)2/(γ − coi − a)2
< 0 if αiβj/αjβi < (γ − coj − a)2/(γ − coi − a)2
(25)
where (γ − coi − a) 6= 0.
Stranger: Using (24), where (γ − coi − b) > (γ − coj − b),
the stranger traffic component is given by σstrij > 0. In this
case ISPj receives the net payment from ISPi.
Proposition 9: If αi > αj and βi = βj , then ISPi
subsidizes ISPj for native traffic.
Proof: From the definition follows that cti < c
t
j , αiβj >
αjβi, and a = cti.
Native: Considering (23), it can be obtained that σnatij > 0.
Here, ISPi gets higher profit than ISPj from native traffic
exchange and consequently, subsidizes the peered network.
Stranger: The expression for stranger traffic business (24) is
not straightforward and is defined by
σstrij
8><>:
> 0 if αjβi/αiβj > (γ − coj − b)2/(γ − coi − b)2
= 0 if αjβi/αiβj = (γ − coj − b)2/(γ − coi − b)2
< 0 if αjβi/αiβj < (γ − coj − b)2/(γ − coi − b)2
(26)
where (γ − coi − b) 6= 0.
Proposition 10: If αi > αj , βi > βj , and tij = tji, then
ISPi subsidizes ISPj for native traffic.
Proof: From the definition follows that a = cti.
Native: Considering the expression (23), it can be obtained
that σnatij > 0. Here, under symmetric traffic volumes, ISPi
subsidizes ISPj for native traffic.
Stranger: The component for the stranger traffic business
(24) is not straightforward and is defined by (26).
Assuming that αi > αj and βi < βj , we investigate the case
when providers’ sizes are symmetric (i.e., cti = c
t
j).
Proposition 11: If αi > αj , βi < βj , and cti = c
t
j ,
then ISPi (ISPj) subsidizes ISPj (ISPi) for native (stranger)
traffic.
Proof: Native: From (23) follows that ISPi subsidizes
ISPj .
Stranger: Using the expression for the stranger traffic busi-
ness (24), it can be obtained that σstrij < 0.
Fig. 1-2 and Tables 1-2 report the results of analytical
studies, which examined the role of the transmission initiator
on both customers and providers. Specifically, Fig. 1-2 show
comparisons of providers’ revenues and profits. The NBS
outcomes and demand comparisons are presented in Tables
1-2. The models consider symmetric and asymmetric access
charges. In order to enable us to calculate specific outcomes,
the following values of termination costs were imposed: i)
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Fig. 1: Comparison of Providers’ Outcomes (Non-reciprocal
Access Charges).
cti = c
t
j = 1 in cases I and V ii) c
t
i = 1, c
t
j = 1.5 in
the other cases. The demand is given by qi(pi) = 10 − pi.
The parameters are chosen to be reasonable to consider
all available market states in terms of provides’ sizes. It
is important to note, that even though the parameters are
chosen arbitrarily, our conclusions do not depend on the
chosen parameter values. The results obtained for a number
of other values have not produced significant changes.
5. Discussions and Conclusions
In this paper we proposed models and their analysis,
which are based on the DTIA strategy for intercarrier cost
compensation. The purpose for this was to explore the effect
of the determination of the transmission initiator on retail
and wholesale markets with reciprocal and non-reciprocal
access charges. In particular, the studies examined demand,
Table 1: Comparative Results of the DTIA and Net Traffic
Flow Compensations (Non-reciprocal Access Charges).
tij tji Π
NBS ∆σ
DTIA TF DTIA TF DTIA TF DTIA TF
I 2.06 2.00 2.06 2.00 8.52 8.00 0.00 0.0
II 2.04 1.88 1.89 1.88 7.74 7.03 0.76 0.0
2.03 1.88 1.90 1.88 7.72 7.03 0.64 0.0
2.01 1.88 1.91 1.88 7.69 7.03 0.53 0.0
1.99 1.88 1.93 1.88 7.67 7.03 0.42 0.0
III 1.89 1.88 1.99 1.88 7.54 7.03 -0.14 0.0
1.91 1.88 1.98 1.88 7.57 7.03 -0.03 0.0
1.93 1.88 1.96 1.88 7.59 7.03 0.09 0.0
1.95 1.88 1.95 1.88 7.62 7.03 0.20 0.0
IV 1.01 0.98 1.02 0.98 3.95 3.66 0.05 0.0
1.48 1.43 1.49 1.43 5.78 5.34 0.12 0.0
1.65 1.59 1.66 1.59 6.47 5.98 0.15 0.0
1.79 1.73 1.80 1.73 7.01 6.47 0.17 0.0
V 3.28 3.28 3.48 3.28 13.97 13.12 -0.83 0.0
2.73 2.72 2.88 2.72 11.58 10.88 -0.62 0.0
2.34 2.32 2.44 2.32 9.88 9.28 -0.41 0.0
2.12 2.08 2.17 2.08 8.86 8.32 -0.21 0.0
interconnection payments, and providers’ profits considering
private peering. The results obtained from analytical studies
(Fig. 1-2 and Tables 1-2) indicated that the traffic differen-
tiation approach provides better results (in terms of demand
and profits) than the classical solution for both models.
From the comparison between DTIA and the agreement
based on the net traffic flow compensation follows that the
demand (the amount of traffic originated by the providers)
is increased. More specifically, DTIA leads to the increase
of the traffic volume originated in one network and ready to
be terminated in the peered network. Traffic level originated
by any customer depends also on another party which is
accepting incoming traffic, and therefore, corresponds to the
minimum level that one would like to originate and another
would like to accept. In the proposed agreement the prices
obtained for stranger traffic are lower than these prices in
the classical model. This is due to the main concept of our
strategy, where providers distinguish traffic and compensate
the cost for carrying stranger traffic partially.
From economics, it is known that the relationship between
price and demand is an inverse relationship. This means that
the decrease in prices leads to the increase in demand. Obvi-
ously, revenues of providers are also increased. Specifically,
retail revenues obtained from consumers and websites are
higher in DTIA than in the classical model. Finally, the
determination of the transmission initiator induces providers
to receive higher profits and increases providers’ outcome
according to NBS (Tables 1-2). Resuming, DTIA is benefi-
cial for both customers and providers.
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Fig. 2: Comparison of Providers’ Outcomes (Reciprocal
Access Charges).
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Table 2: Comparative Results of the DTIA and Net Traffic
Flow Compensations (Reciprocal Access Charges).
tij tji Π
NBS ∆σ
DTIA TF DTIA TF DTIA TF DTIA TF
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